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We present a model describing the demand dynamics of two new products competing for a limited target
market. The demand trajectories of the two products are driven by a market saturation effect and an imitation
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Abstract
We present a model describing the demand dynamics of two new products com-
peting for a limited target market. The demand trajectories of the two products
are driven by a market saturation eﬀect and an imitation eﬀect reßecting the prod-
uct experience of previous adopters. In this general setting, we provide analytical
results for the sales trajectories and lifecycle sales of the competing products. We
use these results to study the impact of launch time delay (acceleration) on overall
lifecycle sales. Our analysis support trade-oﬀ rules that can be used in the tacti-
cal decision-making of a product development team. Taking the perspective of a
team developing one of the competing products, we Þnd that the proÞt-maximizing
launch time response exhibits a counter-intuitive behavior, which results from non-
concavities in the underlying objective function. In particular, we show that a Þrm
facing a launch time delay from a competing product might beneÞt from moving
its own product launch forward in time, opposed to using the softened competitive
situation to further improve its cost position. We identify conditions under which
such non-concavities arise and a marginal cost-beneÞt analysis leads to sub-optimal
launch time decisions. Finally, we analyze the Nash equilibrium in launch time
decisions of the two competing brands.
KEYWORDS: New Product Development, Marketing-Operations Coordination,
Cross-functional Performance Metrics, Cost of Delay, Competitve New Product De-
mand Dynamics
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1 Introduction
A common problem in product development is the trade-oﬀ between the four perfor-
mance metrics: product development lead-time, product unit cost, technical product per-
formance, and overall development cost (Smith and Reinertsen 1991, Figure 1a). To Þnd
a balance between these conßicting objectives in their day-to-day decision-making, de-
velopment teams typically rely on simple trade-oﬀ rules. Such trade-oﬀ rules attempt to
dollarize (i.e. assign a Þnancial value to) changes along any of these metrics and thereby
to create a common ground for comparison across organizational functions (Ulrich and
Eppinger 1999, Figure 1b). However, such a dollarization requires that the development
team is able to compute the impact of a change in one of the four performance metrics on
the new products proÞtability.
While understanding the Þnancial impact of changes in development cost and product
unit cost is relatively simple, understanding the Þnancial impact of a change in launch
time is rather diﬃcult: what is the cost of a one day launch delay, e.g. in the automotive
industry? One million dollars? Maybe two? How can we adequately capture the long-term
impact on market share resulting from the launch delay? Clearly, whichever answer we
choose will have a substantial impact on the quality of the development teams decision
making.
Yet, despite their pivotal role in guiding decision making and cross functional coor-
dination in the development of a new product, the formation of these trade-oﬀ rules is
commonly done in an ad-hoc fashion. One major shortcoming of the current decision
making process is its simplistic treatment of demand dynamics over the product lifecycle.
Standard models either assume that the lifecycle demand of the new product is exogenous
and therefore not aﬀected by a delayed launch (the sales curve is just shifted into the
future) or that there is a pre-determined market window, after which sales are reduced
to zero (Ulrich and Eppinger 1999). Factors that have been identiÞed as critical success
drivers for a new product, such as time-to-market relative to competition (Porter 1985,
Kalish and Lilien 1986), or product diﬀusion (Bass 1969, Krishnan et al. 2000) are, at
best, only included qualitatively (Ulrich and Eppinger 1999).
The Þrst objective of the present manuscript is to overcome this shortcoming by de-
veloping quantitative trade-oﬀ rules with respect to product development lead-time. In
contrast to the simplistic treatment of demand dynamics prevalent in existing models, the
trade-oﬀ rules we derive are grounded on a detailed analysis of competition and product
diﬀusion, and thereby allow for an endogenous analysis of the lifecycle demand with respect
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to changes in development lead time. Our second objective is to demonstrate how such
trade-oﬀ rules can be used for coordination between conßicting objectives of marketing
and operations.
Our work is contributing to three literature streams discussed in Section 2: product
development decisions, normative models of competitive product diﬀusion, and marketing-
operations coordination. SpeciÞcally, we provide the following novel results. First, we
present closed form expressions for the diﬀusion of two competing products within the
same category modeling market saturation and word-of-mouth eﬀects. SpeciÞcally, we
derive closed-form expressions for the product lifecycle sales as functions of the time gap
between the launch of the two brands (Theorem 1). We also investigate how lifecycle
sales are inßuenced by the values of diﬀusion parameters at the brand as well as the
category level (Theorem 2). We extend previous models of competitive product diﬀusion
by explicitly modeling the interactions (word-of-mouth) between potential adopters of one
brand with previous adopters from the same brand as well as with previous adopters
from a competing brand. While this eﬀect has been observed empirically (Mahajan et
al. 1993), previous research has not formally modeled demand dynamics in the presence
of such interactions (See Table 1 for an overview of related research in competitive new
product diﬀusion).
Second, we analyze the coordination between the marketing and the operations eﬀorts
of a team developing one of the competing products. In particular, we model the teams
decision of Þnding the optimal time of product launch. From a marketing perspective, the
team would like to launch the product sooner, as this would lead to higher unit sales over
the lifecycle. From the operations perspective, the team would like to spend additional
time on the detailed engineering of the product and the corresponding production process,
as this would lead to lower unit costs. We show how a project manager can resolve this
tension by deriving (dollarizing) how a change in launch time impacts the proÞtability of
the new product. We derive conditions under which the immediate launch of a new product
is optimal. We also demonstrate that there are situations where making the launch time
decisions on a marginal proÞt basis can be misleading: we show that it might be optimal
to delay market launch despite a negative marginal value of a longer development time
(Theorem 3).
Third, we analyze the existence and the nature of the Nash equilibrium with respect
to the market entry times of the two competing products. For the case of completely
symmetric products, we derive suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium
for which both competitors launch immediately. In addition, we identify the range of cost
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parameters for which the pure strategy equilibrium does not exist. While the existence
of a pure Nash equilibrium for arbitrary set of problem parameters is hard to establish
analytically, we derive a set of conditions that characterize the nature of the equilibrium
for asymmetric players.
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows. After reviewing the related
literature (Section 2), we present a model of competitive diﬀusion and formulate the
optimization problem for the time-to-market for one of the competitors given the estimated
entry time for the other competitor (Section 3). In Section 4 we present closed-form
expressions for the sales trajectories and lifecycle sales of the two competing products.
Section 5 uses these results to balance the marketing and operations metrics in deciding
about the launch time of a new product, followed by our equilibrium analysis presented
in Section 6. Section 7 demonstrates the practical implications of our work and Section 8
provides concluding remarks.
2 Related Literature
Ulrich and Eppinger (1999) recommend a four-step procedure towards evaluating, among
others, the trade-oﬀ between development lead-time and cost: (1) Build a base case Þnan-
cial model (including a spreadsheet and a representation of lifecycle demand), (2) Perform
sensitivity analysis to understand the key assumptions of the model, (3) Use sensitivity
analysis to understand the trade-oﬀs (including the trade-oﬀ between cost and time), and
(4) Consider the inßuence of qualitative factors, including competition and other market
characteristics.
The strength of this approach is its simplicity and the little eﬀort required for imple-
mentation. However, the approach following steps (1)-(3) is biased towards the easily
measurable costs, including idle production plants, the cost of capital, and the expenses
related to additional development time, while ignoring the hidden cost associated with
the negative impact on revenues that results from a delayed launch.
A good example of this approach can be found in Clark (1989), who reports: Research
indicates that each day of delay in market introduction costs an automobile Þrm over
$1 million in lost proÞts, not including the impact of lost market share. While such
numbers are certainly eﬀective in directing senior managements attention to even minor
launch delays, they are of little value when guiding development teams in their operational
decisions. Whether or not a development team in the automobile industry around 1989
would be well advised in spending $1.5 million to avoid a one day launch delay depends
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on how large the market share loss really turns out to be. Thus, a more detailed model is
needed, that goes beyond treating the market side as a qualitative factor or a residual.
Several authors provide qualitative guidelines on how revenues are aﬀected by a slow
(delayed) versus a fast (accelerated) launch, four of which are displayed in Figure 2. Urban
and Hauser (1993) argue that reducing lead-time will increase lifecycle sales, however, with
diminishing returns. It is also suggested that an accelerated launch will increase cost as
well as risk. Given that additional time in development reduces cost at a diminishing rate,
the graph suggests the existence of an optimal launch time. While Urban and Hauser do
emphasize the importance of competition, neither sequence of entry nor the duration of
the Þrst mover monopoly is visible in their graph.
Rosenthal (1992) takes a slightly diﬀerent approach. Based on a forthcoming competi-
tors product introduction, a late launch will give the product a shorter growth period, and
thereby smaller peak sales. Moving from actual (late) introduction to the earlier, planned
introduction seems to indicate increasing returns (peak moves up, so does duration of the
monopoly period). The framework explicitly includes competition - assumed to begin at
the point in time when sales start to fall - and takes the perspective of the Þrst mover.
Kalyanaram and Krishnan (1997) suggest a convex-concave relationship between lead-
time and sales. The convex part of their graph, the authors argue, results from the product
diﬀusion in its monopoly phase. The switching point (from convex to concave) indicates
the beginning of the competitive phase. Similar to Rosenthals model, the authors include
competition and take the perspective of the Þrst mover.
Finally, Wheelwright and Clark (1992) argue that there are steep gains associated with
shortened development lead-times, especially for companies who are head to head with
their competition. Getting too far ahead does not yield the desired increase in proÞts, and
can even result in proÞt loss.
Taken together, all four graphs in Figure 2 emphasize the impact of changes in product
development lead-time on a products lifecycle sales and proÞts. However, by contrasting
the four graphs, we can make a couple of interesting observations. First, all four curves
are purely qualitative and support, at best, step (4) in the Ulrich and Eppinger procedure.
Since none of the curves is described in a functional form, they are impossible to use for
quantitative decision-making. Second, none of the four graphs is derived formally from
a transparent set of assumptions, making it hard for a project manager to judge if the
corresponding model Þts her current situation. In particular, the eﬀects of competition
and diﬀusion (the main diﬀerentiators from spreadsheet based models) are included in a
rather informal manner. Finally, a comparison of the four graphs in Figure 2 is diﬃcult,
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since the graphs diﬀer with respect to both the horizontal axis and the graph plotted along
the vertical axis. We will revisit Figure 2 in Section 7, where we display our analytical
results in the formats used by Rosenthal as well as by Urban and Hauser.
Detailed Models of Market Demand
As a Þrst step towards developing a model of competition and diﬀusion, we turn to
the marketing literature, which provides a rich stream of research related to product
introduction and demand dynamics, speciÞcally in the area of new product diﬀusion models
(Bass 1969)1. The Bass model leads to the S-shaped product diﬀusion that has commonly
been reported for new product categories: sales for a new product are initially low, as there
exists limited word-of-mouth for it, and customers only adopt the product in response
to external inßuences (captured by the coeﬃcient of innovation). With more customers
adopting the product, the word-of-mouth eﬀect for the new product becomes stronger and
the sales rate increases (captured by the coeﬃcient of imitation). Finally, the sales rate
starts to decrease, reßecting the overall market saturation.
A model of category level diﬀusion is important when analyzing the demand dynamics
of two competing products within a category. For example, Krishnan et al. (2000) discuss
how Chrysler introduced the Caravan and the Voyager (brands) back in 1984 and thereby
acted as a pioneer in the minivan (category) market. When a few years later Ford intro-
duced the Aerostar, Ford was able to beneÞt from the category awareness for minivans
and captured a sizable portion of the market. Thus, although the Þrst product to market
obtains 100% of the category sales up to the arrival of the second product, initial sales
can be low given the limited awareness for the new category. We will label this eﬀect as
the category-awareness eﬀect.
Whereas the original models of new product diﬀusion were applied at the product
category level, the last Þfteen years have witnessed the evolution of a signiÞcant body
of research on diﬀusion models incorporating the eﬀects of brand competition within a
category (see Chatterjee et al. 1998 for an overview of competitive diﬀusion models). There
are two eﬀects of brand-level diﬀusion that are important to consider when modeling the
impact of launch time on demand dynamics, brand-level word-of-mouth and cross-brand
word-of-mouth.
In addition to the word-of-mouth eﬀect at the category level, customers also exchange
information at the brand level. Consider a customer deciding which brand within the
mobile phone category to adopt. A customer who has interacted with a prior adopter of
1We will review Basss mathematical model further below. For an overview of the Bass model as well
as its numerous extensions, we refer the reader to Mahajan et al (1990).
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Brand A will not only be more likely to also buy any mobile phone (category-awareness
eﬀect) but will be more (or less) likely to also adopt Brand A. To capture this eﬀect,
Krishnan et al. (2000) extend the traditional Bass model to the brand level and assume
that each brand has its own coeﬃcient of innovation as well as coeﬃcient of imitation.
The coeﬃcient of imitation in the model presented by Krishnan et al. captures the eﬀect
that prior adopters of the category have on the future adopters of a brand as a ...collective
force of all previous adopters that act on each brands future adoption (Krishnan et al.
2000, p. 271). While lumping the eﬀects of brand-level word-of-mouth together into a
collective force makes the resulting diﬀusion equations more elegant, it does not separate
between the word-of-mouth for brand A coming from customers who have adopted brand
A vs. customers who have adopted brand B.
However, such a separation can be important, especially when studying the sales loss
of the incumbent as a result of a new market entrant. This observation is in line with
the empirical work by Mahajan et al. (1993), who specify a model of competition and
diﬀusion, which they use to assess the impact of competitive entry on the incumbents
sales. The model speciÞcation for the empirical analysis by Mahajan et al. (1993) not
only includes the word-of-mouth between potential adopters of one brand with previous
adopters from the entire category but explicitly models the cross brand word-of-mouth of
both brands separately. The model is used to study the competition between Polaroid and
Kodak and to evaluate Polaroids sales loss as a result of Kodaks patent infringement. As
we share Mahajan et al.s interest in understanding the impact of competitive entry on the
incumbents sales dynamics, we incorporate their concept of cross brand word-of-mouth
into our analysis.
Despite the successful use of competitive Bass-type diﬀusion models empirically, only
three prior articles have presented normative models related to the timing of entry within
a competitive diﬀusion context (Chatterjee et al. 1998). The three studies are compared
in Table 1, together with the two most relevant empirical studies as well as the present
manuscript. Eliashberg and Jeuland (1986) consider a pioneering brand and a competing
brand introduced at a later point. Their study takes the launch times as exogenous and
focus on pricing decisions. The underlying demand model is characterized by a saturation
eﬀect, but does not include a word-of-mouth eﬀect. Similarly, Fershtman, Mahajan and
Muller (1990) focus on pricing decisions, but also include an advertising decision. Unlike
Eliashberg and Jeuland (1986), their demand model is characterized by a word-of-mouth
eﬀect, but does not include a saturation eﬀect. The only competitive diﬀusion model with
saturation and word-of-mouth eﬀect is provided by Kalish, Mahajan, and Muller (1995).
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Yet, given that the authors analyze the timing of entry in diﬀerent global markets, they
do not provide analytical results on how a change in launch time inßuences the lifecycle
sales and proÞtability of the product.
Marketing-Operations Coordination
From the operations perspective, an additional day in development provides the oppor-
tunity to spend more time on Þne-tuning the product and its corresponding manufacturing
process. Bhattacharya et al. (1998) distinguish between extra time that is used towards
improving the product performance of the new product (concept deÞnition) and time that
is used to reduce product unit cost for a given concept (set of features). In our analysis,
we assume that the product concept is frozen and that all additional time will be spent
towards reducing the products unit cost. We thereby model the trade-oﬀ between launch
time and one out of the three performance dimensions in Figure 1. Extending this analysis
to either include a third dimension, or to include a diﬀerent second dimension (product
performance or development cost) is interesting, yet beyond the scope of this paper.
From the marketing perspective, an additional day in development will typically not
be welcome. The pool of potential customers is shrinking because of current or future
competition (market saturation eﬀect). Moreover, the product category diﬀusion will
commence (category level word-of-mouth eﬀect) and the competing product will have
an opportunity to receive more brand-level word of mouth (brand level word-of-mouth
eﬀect). Given these conßicting objectives, a decision maker needs to compare foregone
proÞt margins resulting from a delayed launch with reduced unit costs over the entire
product lifecycle. If engineers improve unit cost corresponding to $500K cost savings for
each extra day while the market is shrinking with a Þnancial impact of $1 million each
day, it is probably time to launch. Thus, a dollarization of delay creates a truly cross-
functional performance metric, leading to improved coordination between marketing and
operations.
However, there are situations where attempts of coordinating marketing and operations
based on marginal analysis can lead to overall Pareto-ineﬃciencies. De Groote (1994)
presents a model in which the operations function chooses an optimal batch size and
a production technology, which is driving the set-up costs per batch, while marketing
chooses the degree of product variety. In this set-up, each of the two functions fully takes
into account its impact on the other function, thus coordination ineﬃciencies do not arise
from ignorance. However, as their choice is based on a marginal analysis (What is the
degree of variety for the current production technology? What is the optimal production
technology for the current degree of variety?), the Þrm as a whole may forego a global
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performance maximum (higher variety with more ßexible production technology). Other
studies pointing at a need for a more integrated decision making include Schmidt and
Porteus (2000) and Cohen et al. (2000).
3 Model Formulation
Using a model of competitive product diﬀusion similar to the one underlying the empirical
studies by Krishnan et al. (2000), we consider the competitive diﬀusion of two products
(1 and 2). At t = 0, the manager responsible for the launch of product 1, is faced
with the decision of when to launch her product, provided that the launch time of the
competing product 2, T2, is known. T2 may be positive or negative, reßecting the fact that
product 2 may yet to be launched or may be launched already. DeÞne the beginning of
the competitive diﬀusion as tc = max (T2, T1).
We assume that the two competing products jointly constitute a product category and
compete for the same population of potential adopters of sizem. We assume the population
of potential adopters to be independent of the number of products currently on the market,
which allows us to isolate the saturation eﬀect discussed above. Thus, when the second
product enters, the rate of diﬀusion will change, but not the market potential. Our model
would have to be extended to capture the case that a new product entering the market
not only alters the diﬀusion rate, but also increases the population of potential adopters
(see Krishnan et al. 2000 for an excellent discussion of these two eﬀects)2.
The competitive new product diﬀusion process is speciÞed as follows. Sales of prod-
uct i reßect product adoption by three diﬀerent groups of adopters: innovators, who
adopt product i based on an external inßuence, imitators, who adopt due to networking
interaction (internal inßuence) with those who already adopted the same product, and
cross-imitators, who adopt product i after interacting with those who already adopted
product j. This adoption process is illustrated in Figure 3. For t ≥ tc, denote the cumu-
lative sales function of product i by Di(t), i = 1, 2. The sales rate of product i depends
on the cumulative sales of both products by time t:
dD1
dt
=
µ
p1 +
1
m
(q11D1(t) + q12D2(t))
¶
(m−D1(t)−D2(t)) ,
dD2
dt
=
µ
p2 +
1
m
(q21D1(t) + q22D2(t))
¶
(m−D1(t)−D2(t)) . (1)
2Closed form solutions for our model can still be obtained for that generalized case as long as the
population of potential adopters is a constant m for t < tc and a (diﬀerent) constant M for t ≥ tc. Note
that this formulation does include the Krishnan et al. (2000) model.
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Diﬀusion equations (1) represent an extension of the diﬀusion dynamics in Bass (1969)
and reßect the interaction between the individual diﬀusions for products 1 and 2 through
both the market saturation eﬀect m − D1(t) − D2(t), as well as through the word-of-
mouth eﬀect. The word-of-mouth eﬀect occurs both at the category level as well as at the
brand level. SpeciÞcally, qij deÞnes the probability that a customer adopts product i after
having interacted with a previous adopter of product j. Mahajan et al. (1993) label this
coeﬃcient - for i 6= j -as the brand competition eﬀect3.
We assume that the sales of the entire product category D(t) = D1(t) + D2(t) follow
the classical Bass pattern. We observe that (3) describes a Bass diﬀusion only if
q11 + q21 = q12 + q22 = q (2)
where q captures the category level word-of-mouth eﬀect. The assumption of brand level
diﬀusions jointly constituting a category level diﬀusion follows the argument by Krishnan
et al. (2000) who convincingly argue: The property that the proposed brand-level model
sums up to the Bass category-level model may look restrictive, but it gives indirect face
validity to the proposed model because the Bass (1969) model has a strong behavioral
basis and has found excellent empirical support over a wide range of products.
Adding the two equations in the (1), we obtain:
dD
dt
=
µ
p+
1
m
((q11 + q21)D1(t) + (q12 + q22)D2(t))
¶
(m−D(t)) . (3)
where p = p1 + p2.
DeÞne β = p1
p
as the probability that an innovative customer will select product 1,
given that she decided to adopt one of the two products. The coeﬃcient of external
inßuence, p, in a diﬀusion captures all time-invariant eﬀects on the adoption decision of
the customer. This includes the absolute attractiveness of the product, the awareness of
the product created independent of market share (e.g. media advertising), or the price
position of the new product. Consequently β provides a measure to what extent the
external inßuence of the diﬀusion favors brand 1 versus brand 2. If β = 0.5, both products
experience the same external inßuence.
Further, deÞne α1 =
q11
q
and α2 =
q22
q
. The αi describe the imitation process for the
respective product brands and can be interpreted as measures of relative attractiveness
for potential adopters. We can then express (1) as
dD1
dt
=
µ
pβ +
q
m
(α1D1(t) + (1− α2)D2(t))
¶
(m−D1(t)−D2(t)) ,
3A similar functional form is also used in models of multi-product diﬀusion (see Peterson and Mahajan
1978, Bayus et al. 2000)
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dD2
dt
=
µ
p (1− β) + q
m
((1− α1)D1(t) + α2D2(t))
¶
(m−D1(t)−D2(t)) . (4)
We note that the general set of diﬀusion equations (4) includes two important com-
petitive diﬀusion regimes as particular cases. On the one hand, when α1, α2 → 0.5, the
competitive diﬀusion proceeds mainly at the level of the entire category - in this case, the
imitative consumers look at each of the competitors as members of a particular category,
rather than individual products. On the other hand, when α1, α2 → 1, the diﬀusion shifts
to the level of the individual brands.
Similar to prior studies in this Þeld (Bayus et al. (1997), Krishnan et al. (2000),
Mahajan et al. (1993)), our analysis treats the diﬀusion coeﬃcients pi and qij , and thereby
α1, α2, and β, as exogenously given. Given the extensive body of research on diﬀusion
models in various industries (e.g. Van den Bulte 2000), it is possible to obtain good
predictions for the corresponding diﬀusion parameters4. Since the values of the diﬀusion
parameters can be inßuenced by marketing mix variables, such as advertising and pricing
(see Bass et al. 1994, Bass et al. 2000), using past diﬀusion parameters to describe the
projected sales of a new product implicitly assumes that the marketing decisions involved
in managing the sales processes of new products will be predictable and similar to those
used in the past. This assumption allows us to isolate the eﬀects of launch time delays on
the life-cycle sales of a new product in a competitive environment5.
Product 1 may be introduced at any time T1 ≥ 0. Let T = T2 − T1 denote the launch
time gap between the two products: T > 0 indicates that product 1 is introduced ahead of
product 2, while T < 0 corresponds to the case when product 2 is introduced Þrst. Note
that, since T1 ≥ 0, T ≤ T2. Since by t = tc ≥ 0 one of the products enjoyed a monopoly
setting, the initial conditions for (1) are
(D1(t = tc), D2(t = tc)) =
³
D1(T ), D2(T )
´
(5)
where
D1(T ) =
 0, T ≤ 0,m ³1− pβ+qα1
qα1+pβ exp((pβ+qα1)T )
´
, T > 0,
(6)
D2(T ) =
 m
³
1− p(1−β)+qα2
qα2+p(1−β) exp((p(1−β)+qα2)|T |)
´
, T ≤ 0,
0, T > 0,
(7)
4If the parameters are not known at the beginning of the diﬀusion, one would have to rely on an
updating mechanism to improve the estimates dynamically (see e.g. Xie et al. 1997).
5See Bass et al. (1994) for an excellent overview on how marketing mix decisions relate to product
diﬀusion.
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are the cumulative sales of product i prior to competition (Bass 1969). If both sales
processes start simultaneously, T = 0 and (D1(t = tc),D2(t = tc)) = (0, 0). This set-up
assumes that the product Þrst to market will follow a Bass diﬀusion, which means that
consumers are not anticipating - and potentially delaying - their adoption decision because
of the future launch of the product second to market6.
Our analysis will take the position of a Þrm launching product 1. We are interested
in obtaining expressions for the lifecycle sales M1(T ) = D1 (+∞), and, in particular, in
quantifying the impact of a delayed launch on the lifecycle sales dM1(T )/dT . As we do not
model changes in prices and production costs over the course of the lifecycle, the overall
lifecycle sales also provides a measure of proÞts derived from the new product.
While an extended development time will have negative consequences through reduced
lifecycle sales, such an extension might be warranted if it is connected with operational
improvements. We assume that there exists a constant return to cost reduction eﬀort,
thus unit cost for product 1 can be written as:
c1(T1) = δ0 + δ1e
−γT1 (8)
where δ0, δ1, and γ are all non-negative. In (8), δ0+δ1 denotes the unit cost if product 1 is
launched immediately, while δ0 corresponds to the minimum possible unit cost. γ denotes
the rate with which the development team can reduce cost. As reßected in (8), we assume
that the per unit costs are driven largely by the product design, opposed to experience
eﬀects (learning curves) in the manufacturing facility. This assumption is consistent with
Eliashberg and Jeuland (1986) and Kalish et al. (1995). In contrast, Fershtman et al.
(1990) allow for volume learning, i.e. unit cost falling with cumulative output. None
of the previous studies considers cost reduction opportunities resulting from a delayed
launch.
Denoting by π the average (over the life-cycle period) selling price for product 1, we
can express the proÞt margin of product 1 given launch time T1:
σ (T1) = π − δ0 − δ1e−γT1 = (π − δ0)
³
1− ce−γT1
´
, (9)
where c = δ1
π−δ0 . Here we assume that, irrespective of chosen launch time, the proÞt margin
remains non-negative, so that π > δ0 and 0 ≤ c ≤ 1. Combining our demand model given
by (4) and (5) with the model of cost reduction in (8), we can state the optimization
problem for the Þrm launching product 1 as:
P = max
T≤T2
³
M1(T )
³
1− ceγ(T−T2)
´´
(10)
6See Eliashberg et al. (2002) for how the announcement of a new product impacts the diﬀusion pattern.
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The optimization model (10) focuses on the optimal response of a team developing a
new product to the market entry of a competitor, which has happened in the past (T2 < 0)
or is expected to happen in the future (T2 > 0). The central part of the analysis of such
optimal response relies on the properties of the lifecycle sales function M1(T ), which we
analyze in the following section.
4 The Impact of Launch Time on Lifecycle Sales
The competitive diﬀusion described by (1) has one important property (Lemma 1): for
every value of the launch gap T 6= 0, sales of both products can be shown to be equivalent
to those for some synchronous (T = 0) diﬀusion. DeÞne the remaining market potential
m (T ) for a given launch time T as:
m (T ) = m−
2X
i=1
Di(T ). (11)
Moreover, deÞne the launch time adjusted coeﬃcients of innovation and imitation as:
pi (T ) = pi +
2X
j=1
qij
m
Dj(T ), ∀i = 1, 2, (12)
qij(T ) =
qij
m
m (T ) , i, j = 1, 2 (13)
The sales of the competing products can be expressed as follows:
Lemma 1: Denote p = (p1, p2) and q = (q11, q12, q21, q22). Also, for T 6= 0, denote by
Di(t, T,p,q,m), i = 1, 2 the solution to (1) subject to initial conditions (5), t ≥ tc. Then,
Di(t, T,p,q,m) = Di(t− tc, 0,p(T ),q(T ),m(T )) +Di(T ), i = 1, 2, t ≥ tc (14)
Lemma 1 stipulates that the diﬀusion patterns for two products entering the market at
diﬀerent points in time can be reduced to diﬀusion patterns with a simultaneous market
entry. The transformation (14) is intuitive. The market size for the phase with both
products on the market needs to be reduced to account for the sales that the pioneer-
ing product could realize before the beginning of competition. Moreover, the customers
who have adopted the pioneering product will create and additional external inßuence
on consumers for the pioneering product, which increases the corresponding coeﬃcient of
innovation.
Based on the deÞnitions (11)-(13), we can make two interesting observations. First,
unlike Kalish et al. (1995), our demand dynamics of the overall category diﬀusion are
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still consistent with the traditional Bass dynamics as outlined in Bass (1969). Second,
while the transformations (11)-(13) change both the market size and the imitation pa-
rameters, the imitation and cross-imitation components of the diﬀusion dynamics
qij(T )
m(T )
remain unchanged.
Using the launch gap transformations introduced above, we can establish the sales
trajectories of the competing products as well as their lifecycle sales for any combination
of the launch gap and the diﬀusion parameters. Towards this goal, deÞne D(T ) = D1(T )+
D2(T ) using the transformation deÞned by (6) and (7).
Theorem 1
(a) Let D (t) = m
³
1− q+p
q+p exp((p+q)t)
´
denote the cumulative sales for the entire product
category at time t. Then, if there is a market entry gap between two products T = T2−T1,
the cumulative sales of competing brands are given by
D1(t) =

µ
D1(T )− (1−α2)D(T )2−α1−α2 + pmq(α1+α2−1)
³
β − (1−α2)
(2−α1−α2)
´¶Ã 1+ qD(t)
pm
1+
qD(T )
pm
!α1+α2−1
+ (1−α2)
(2−α1−α2)D(t)− pmq(α1+α2−1)
³
β − (1−α2)
(2−α1−α2)
´
,
α1 + α2 6= 1,α1 + α2 < 2,
D1(T ) + α1
³
D(t)−D(T )
´
+ pm(β−α1)
q
log
Ã
1+
qD(t)
pm
1+
qD(T )
pm
!
,
α1 + α2 = 1,
(pβ+ qmD1(T ))D(t)+p(D1(T )−βD(T ))
p+ q
m
D(T )
,α1 + α2 = 2,
D2(t) = D(t)−D1(t), (15)
(b) For any T , the lifecycle sales for product 1, M1(T ), are given by:
M1(T ) =

µ
D1(T )− (1−α2)D(T )2−α1−α2 +
pm
q(α1+α2−1)
³
β − (1−α2)
(2−α1−α2)
´¶Ã 1+ q
p
1+
qD(T )
pm
!α1+α2−1
+ (1−α2)
(2−α1−α2)m− pmq(α1+α2−1)
³
β − (1−α2)
(2−α1−α2)
´
,
α1 + α2 6= 1,α1 + α2 < 2,
D1(T ) + α1
³
m−D(T )
´
+ pm(β−α1)
q
log
Ã
1+ q
p
1+
qD(T )
pm
!
,
α1 + α2 = 1,
(pβ+ qmD1(T ))m+p(D1(T )−βD(T ))
p+ q
m
D(T )
,α1 + α2 = 2,
(16)
The above result speciÞes the cumulative sales of each of the competing products at
any point in time as well as the values of the lifecycle sales acquired at the end of the
competitive diﬀusion period. We observe that while the sales dynamics of the entire
category follows the Bass pattern, the individual product sales can be very diﬀerent from
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it. Figures 4 and 5 show how the demand rate for competitor 1 is inßuenced by the market
entry time of the competitor 2 for the cases when the competitive diﬀusion proceeds on
the level of the entire product category (α1 = α2 = 0.5, Figure 4) or, almost entirely, on
the brand level (α1 = α2 = 0.9, Figure 5).
Figure 4 indicates that while the position of the demand peak for competitor 1 is pushed
into the future as the entrance of the competitor 2 is delayed, the height of this demand
peak is not inßuenced by the competitors entry time unless the competitor is starting
very far ahead. This last feature is a direct consequence of the category nature of the
competitive diﬀusion process. Note that the competitors entry creates a kink in the sales
curve most visible for the curves corresponding to T=10 and T=20. Figure 5 demonstrates
that for the brand level diﬀusion both the position of the demand peak and its height
are, as expected, monotone functions of competitors entry time.
The closed-form expressions (16) for lifecycle sales are of fundamental importance for
our analysis of the impact of launch time on lifecycle sales. This impact can be quantiÞed
by evaluating monotonicity and curvature of lifecycle sales as a function of launch time T .
Theorem 2 captures these properties.
Theorem 2
(a) Lifecycle sales for product 1, M1(T ), increases with relative product attractiveness,
α1, and the value of external inßuence, β. M1(T ) decreases with launch delay T and the
relative attractiveness of the competing product, α2.
(b) For any 0 < α1,β < 1, there exists a launch delay value Tmax such that M1(T )
is a concave function of T for T ≥ Tmax. In addition, there exists a launch delay value
Tmin < Tmax such that M1(T ) is a convex (concave) function of T for 0 ≤ T ≤ Tmin
provided that p
q
< (>)α1
β
+ 1−α1
1−β − α1 − α2.
As expected, lifecycle sales of product 1 decrease with its launch delay. A similar eﬀect
is observed when the relative attractiveness of the product, as measured by the ratio of
its α coeﬃcient to that one of the competing product, increases. Increases in the strength
of the external inßuence, β, will also lead to an increase in products lifecycle sales.
Part (b) of Theorem 2 states the properties for the lifecycle sales of product 1 for
the case when it is introduced ahead of product 2. The analogous statements for the
case when product 2 is introduced Þrst, are easily obtained by interchanging α1 and α2
as well as β and 1 − β in the above expressions and using the conservation condition
M1(T ) +M2(T ) = m.
We observe that lifecycle sales of product 1 as a function of its launch delay can exhibit
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a non-concave behavior. In other words, the marginal impact of a launch delay does
not have to be monotone. Such non-concavities are of importance for the structure of the
optimization problem (10) and will strongly impact the marketing-operations coordination
analyzed in the following section. This may happen, in particular, in cases when competing
products with similar relative attractiveness levels are subject to very dissimilar external
inßuences, or similar external inßuences exist for products with very diﬀerent relative
attractiveness levels. For example, in the case of α1 = α2 = 0.8, β = 0.7 (attractive
products, external inßuence for product 1 heavily dominates that of product 2) the non-
concavity occurs for p
q
< 0.21 - a condition which is satisÞed for the vast majority of
products (for example, the average estimated p
q
ratio for the new durable products in
the seminal Bass (1969) paper is around 0.05). Similarly, in the case when β = 0.5 and
α1 = 0.7, α2 = 0.2 (equal external inßuence in the situation when product 1 is relatively
more attractive than product 2) the non-concavity condition of Theorem 2, p
q
< 1.1, is
clearly satisÞed.
Theorems 1 and 2 enable us to address the questions that we raised in our discussion
of Figure 2 by analyzing the impact of diﬀerent diﬀusion parameters and entry times
on the products lifecycle sales. The following analysis uses parameter ranges based on
the category diﬀusion as estimated by Bass (1969). SpeciÞcally, we assume a coeﬃcient
of innovation p = 0.0163221, a coeﬃcient of imitation of q = 0.325044, and a market
potential of m = 41, 298, 400. Moreover, in order to isolate the eﬀect of launch time, we
assume that both products are subject to the same degree of external inßuence (β = 0.5).
Figure 6 plots the marginal loss in lifecycle sales as a function of the launch delay T .
Consider Þrst the case where the word-of-mouth predominantly occurs at the brand level
(α1 and α2 are both fairly large, here chosen as α1 = α2 = 0.9). At T = 0, a one unit
acceleration in launch time will lead to a 0.08 increase in lifecycle sales. The beneÞt of
an early launch is not only the market-saturation eﬀect, but it is also one of creating a
customer base which will lead to an increase in future sales rates as a result of positive
word-of-mouth at the brand-level. However, as can be seen by moving from the origin
to the left, further acceleration exhibits diminishing returns. This is consistent with the
argument by Urban and Hauser (moving from zero to the left). Moreover, as was argued
by Kalyanaram and Krishnan, the maximum loss occurs indeed when both competitors
are launching head to head (T = 0).
If we move the word-of-mouth eﬀect from the brand-level to the category level (α1 =
α2 = 0.7 and α1 = α2 = 0.3), something interesting happens. The single peak of Figure 6
breaks up into two symmetric peaks, one of each side of the origin (T = 0). These peaks
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drift apart with a further reduction in αi. This reßects the now weaker word-of-mouth
eﬀect of the brand. New customers adopt the category, but do so without considering
which brand has currently the larger installed base. Thus, customers think of the product
they purchase as the category (minivan) opposed to the brand (Caravan, Aero). This
substantially weakens the position of the incumbent compared to the case with high αi.
Figure 6 shows that - although any acceleration in product launch is beneÞcial (dMi
dT
> 0)
- such beneÞts do not necessarily exhibit diminishing returns. Especially for low values
of αi, we observe two maxima in Figure 6, thus
d2Mi
d2T 2
can be positive or negative. Hence,
in a case where consumers think of a product as a member of a category, opposed to a
unique brand, a development team facing head-to-head competition concerning market
entry time (T = 0) looses fewer units of lifecycle sales per unit launch delay than one
would intuitively expect. An application of marginal trade-oﬀ rules when coordinating
with the operations decision on how much time should be spent on unit cost reduction is
thereby likely to lead to a local, sub-optimal maximum.
Figure 7 analyzes the cost of delay for varying levels of word-of-mouth, q, for the
overall product category. For the same external inßuence, higher levels of word-of-mouth
are associated with a faster product diﬀusion. As indicated by Figure 7, a one time-unit
delay at T = 0 in the case of q = 0.325 corresponds to a roughly 3% loss in lifecycle sales.
For q = 0.625, in contrast, this loss increases to well over 5% loss in lifecycle sales per unit
of delay-time.
Figures 6 and 7 have considered two products of equal desirability (α1 = α2). Figure 8,
in contrast, considers the case where product 1 is more desirable than product 2 (in this
case α1 = 0.8; α2 = 0.6). We observe that the symmetry from Figures 6 and 7 is replaced
by an asymmetric double-hump, as described by Wheelwright and Clark. This has the
following implications. If product 1 would be able to accelerate its development process,
it would introduce a strong product as the Þrst entrant, which would be rewarded with
substantial gains in lifecycle sales (up to a 3% gain in lifecycle sales per unit acceleration).
On the other hand, given the attractiveness of product 1, product 1 can aﬀord a delayed
entry. Even in presence of a relatively large installed base of product 2, a large number
of residual potential adopters would still purchase product 1 (q12 is large). However, for
large values of launch delays of product 1, the market saturation eﬀect becomes dominant,
and even a superior product is facing limited market potential. The case of diﬀerent levels
of product attractiveness provides an interesting extension opportunity for the model
presented above. While in our model, the development team spends additional time on
cost reduction eﬀort, one could develop an alternative model in which a team used extra
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development time to increase the products relative attractiveness.
In summary, our formal model is able to explain some of the apparent inconsistencies
that exist in the prior literature as displayed in Figure 2. Previous results were not right
or wrong, they were simply under-speciÞed, thereby making latent assumptions about
the underlying levels of product attractiveness (low vs. high levels of α1 and α2) and
diﬀusion dynamics (word of mouth at the brand vs. at the category level).
5 Optimal Time-to-Market Responses
Now, consider a development team which faces the following trade-oﬀs. From the market
side, an additional week delaying the product launch would lead to a loss of $150K resulting
from foregone revenue margins. At the same time, an additional week delaying the product
launch would allow for further eﬀort in DFM activity, leading to a $100K savings in
manufacturing costs. Is it time to launch? The costs of delay seem to outweigh the
beneÞts. However, such a marginal analysis can be misleading, as - due to non-concavities
in the underlying objective function - multiple local optima can exist. This requires a more
detailed analysis of the optimal launch time decision, which is presented in the following
Theorem.
Theorem 3 (a) The optimal launch gap T ∗ is a non-decreasing function of T2 and α2,
and a non-increasing function of c. Also, there exists γ∗ such that T ∗ is a non-increasing
(non-decreasing) function of γ for γ < γ∗ (γ > γ∗).
(b) Let α1+α2 6= 1,α1+α2 < 2. For given p, q, α1, β and T2, deÞne bT = 1pβ+qα1 log ³qα1pβ ´
as the time of the peak demand in product 1 monopoly diﬀusion and
h∗ =

p2β(1−β)
(p+q)
, T2 < 2 bT,
p2β(1−β)
(p+q)
(pβ+qα1)
2e(pβ+qα1)T2
(qα1+pβe(pβ+qα1)T2)
2 , T2 ≥ 2 bT , (17)
Then, an immediate launch of product 1 is optimal provided that cγ
1−c < h
∗.
The statement of Theorem 3 identiÞes the sensitivity properties of the optimal launch
gap for a given entry time of the competing product. In particular, part (a) of Theorem
3 states that as the expected time of product 2s entry is pushed into the future, it is
optimal for brand 1 to respond by increasing the gap T ∗ between launches of competing
brands.
While this increase in the launch gap is intuitive, surprisingly, a delay of product 2s
launch can drive the optimal launch date for product 1 forward in time. For example,
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consider the case where product 2 is to be launched at time 10 and product 1 at time
2 (the launch gap is 8). Now, product 2 announces a delay in launch, say to time 12.
Depending on the parameters of the problem, it may be optimal for product 1 to respond
by moving its launch forward in time (e.g. to launch at time 1), which would lead to a
launch gap of 11, or, by moving its launch backward in time (e.g. to launch at time 3),
which would lead to a launch gap of 9. Thus, in both cases, the launch gap is increased,
yet the actual launch date for product 1 could go either way.
An illustration of this phenomena is presented in Figure 9: we observe that as the launch
time of product 2 increases, the optimal response for product 1 changes discontinuously
at bT2 = 19.5 from an increasing to a decreasing function. Such discontinuity is a direct
consequence of the non-concavity of the product 1 lifecycle sales function M1(T ) and
occurs when the proÞt function P has two competing local maxima, so that one of them
is preferred for T2 < bT2 and the other one for T2 > bT2. In particular, for T2 < bT2, it is
optimal to launch product 1 after product 2, and the optimal launch time for product 1 is
an increasing function of T2. For T2 > bT2, the optimal market launch response of product
1 changes drastically - it is now optimal to launch product 1 before product 2, and the
launch time for product 1 is pushed forward as the launch of a competitor is delayed.
The optimal launch gap is decreasing in the cost parameter c. In other words, the better
the cost position of product 1, the more will it beneÞt from achieving a high level of lifecycle
sales (Figure 10a). A decrease in the relative attractiveness of product 2, α2, leads to a later
launch for product 1. The intuition behind this result is that the decreased attractiveness
of product 2 allows product 1 to spend extra time on cost reduction without incurring
signiÞcant lifecycle losses (Figure 10b). Figure 10b shows an example of a discontinuous
change in T ∗ at α∗2 = 0.56. Just like in the example of Figure 7, such discontinuity reßects
an existence of two local maxima in the proÞt function, with one of them being preferred
for α2 < α
∗
2 and the other for α2 > α
∗
2. In the example shown in Figure 10b the optimal
response for product 1 at α2 = α
∗
2 exhibits a fundamental change: from launching 6 units
of time behind product 2 to launching 10 units ahead. Again, this is a direct result of the
non-concavity of lifecycle sales with respect to the launch gap T .
Theorem 3 identiÞes a non-monotone response of the optimal launch gap to changes
in the speed of cost reduction γ. We illustrate this behavior in Figure 11. For small
values of γ, the return to a delay in terms of unit cost reduction is low, thus, the Þrm will
favor a quick launch. In the other extreme, if γ is large, i.e. cost reductions are achieved
extremely rapidly, not much of a delay is needed. Even a small delay is suﬃcient to achieve
a good cost position. In-between (γ = 0.2 in Figure 11), the delay will be at a maximum,
19
represented by a minimum launch gap.
Part b of Theorem 3 states suﬃcient conditions for the optimality of an immediate
launch of product 1 for the most general case of α1 + α2 6= 1,α1 + α2 < 2 (similar
statements can be obtained for the cases of α1 + α2 = 1 and α1 + α2 = 2). Parameter h
∗
describes the eﬀective rate of sales loss for product 1 in a competitive environment in the
case when the market introduction of product 1 is delayed. In Theorem 3, the analysis of
the cost-sales trade-oﬀ is reduced to a simple comparison between h∗ and the eﬀective rate
of production cost reduction cγ
1−c . In particular, the statement of the Theorem quantiÞes
the range of values for the rate of process improvement γ or potential cost reduction c for
which delays in market introduction of a new product are not warranted.
(17) indicates that, as expected, the eﬀective rate of sales loss h∗ is a decreasing function
of the competitors market entry time T2. If the competitor (product 2) has already
entered the market or is planning to enter in not-too-distant future (sooner than 2 bT ), the
immediate market entry for product 1 is imperative under innovation-driven category-level
demand processes (high values of p and low values of q). This conclusion is intuitively
appealing, since innovation-driven demand processes are faster than imitation-driven
ones, characterized by low values of p and high values of q: they start at higher sales
rates, reach sales peaks sooner and die out faster. If the competitors market entry is
expected in a distant future (later than 2 bT ), the optimality of the immediate launch for
the same values of category diﬀusion parameters is no longer assured: as the expected
competitors entry is shifted into the future, there is an increasing incentive to delay the
launch of product 1 and beneÞt from the production cost savings. The suﬃcient conditions
of Theorem 3 are quite general in that they guarantee the optimality of the immediate
launch of product 1 irrespective of the attractiveness level of the competing product 2.
6 Competitive Market Entry Decisions
The analysis of Section 5 focuses on a companys optimal response for a given market
entry of a competitor. While such analysis may be valid in the settings when competition
has already made its move (T2 < 0) or is committed to a certain launch time in the future,
an equilibrium analysis of the market entry decisions is generally more desirable. In this
Section we consider a setting in which at t = 0 neither of the competitors have entered the
market. Following the notation deÞned in Section 3, we can express the proÞt functions
of the two competitors as
Π1 (T1, T2) = M1(T2 − T1)
³
1− c1e−γ1T1
´
, (18)
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Π2 (T1, T2) = (m−M1(T2 − T1))
³
1− c2e−γ2T2
´
. (19)
where we have introduced the cost parameters for the second competitor, c2 and γ2. Our
objective is to characterize a Nash equilibrium in market entry times. In equilibrium, each
competitor will choose its market entry time as the best possible response to the market
entry time of its competitor. Thus, (T ∗1 , T
∗
2 ) are an equilibrium if:
T ∗1 = argmax
T1≥0
(Π1 (T1, T
∗
2 )) , (20)
T ∗2 = argmax
T2≥0
(Π2 (T
∗
1 , T2)) . (21)
The complex structure of the lifecycle sales function M1(T ) complicates the equilibrium
analysis substantially, both with respect to establishing existence and uniqueness of the
solution to (20)-(21). However, a set of general results characterizing T ∗1 and T
∗
2 can still
be obtained as outlined below.
We Þrst provide a partial characterization of the entry Nash equilibrium in the sym-
metric case of α1 = α2 = α, β = 0.5, c1 = c2 = c, γ1 = γ2 = γ. For 0.5 < α < 1,
deÞne
c∗ =
p
2
³
1 + q
p
´2α−1
γ + p
2
³
1 + q
p
´2α−1 , (22)
B(c) = 1− qα+
p
2
qα+ p
2
³
c
c∗
´ qα+ p2
γ
, (23)
and
L(c∗) =
c > c∗| (1− c)
1 + (B (c))
 1 + qp
1 + q
p
− q
p
B (c)
2α−1
 > 1− c∗
 . (24)
Then, we can establish the following properties of the entry-times Nash-equilibrium:
Theorem 4a (Symmetric products)
a) For c ≤ c∗, there exists a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium in which both Þrms
favor an immediate launch, i.e. T ∗1 = T
∗
2 = 0.
b) For c ∈ L (c∗), there exists no solution to (20) and (21), and thus there exists no pure
strategy equilibrium.
The Þrst result of Theorem 4a implies that the identical products enter the market si-
multaneously as long as the value of the potential cost gains associated with launch delays
is low. It is interesting to note that the maximum value of the cost gains assuring the im-
mediate launch is a rapidly increasing function of α. In particular, when the competitive
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diﬀusion shifts to the category level (α → 0.5), c∗ approaches p
2γ+p
. On the other hand,
when the diﬀusion shifts to the brand level (α→ 1), c∗ approaches, q
2γ+q
- a potentially
much higher value (assuming that the rate of cost improvements γ is not too low).
The second result of Theorem 4a indicates that even for the symmetric case a Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies is not guaranteed to exist. We could not provide a concise
characterization of the entire region in which c is greater than c∗. However, we could
establish that the pure strategy Nash equilibrium certainly does not exist for some c
exceeding c∗, in particular those in the interval L (c∗).
In the absence of pure strategy equilibria, mixed strategy equilibria that involve ran-
domized strategies could still exist. Although it seems diﬃcult to imagine companies
randomizing over such important decisions such as launch times, several points are worth
noting. The Þrst relates to the structure of the best response function, which is illustrated
by Figure 12. The horizontal axis shows the entry time of the competitor and the ver-
tical axis shows the corresponding best response. Given that the competitor launches at
relatively early time T , a development team prefers to respond with a launch at Tr > T .
Launching after the competitor allows the team to beneÞt from lower unit costs while also
free-riding on the category diﬀusion set forth by the competitor.
Interpreting the concept of Nash equilibrium as an iterative application of best response
functions, we end up in a scenario, where both players iteratively - at least initially - it-
eratively delay their launch7. However, we observe that for every unit of delay of the
competitors launch, the development team delays its own launch only by about 0.5 time
units. This can be seen in Figure 12 by comparing the initial part of the best response
function with the identity line. Thus, the process of waiting for the other party to launch
does not continue indeÞnitely: once the hypothetical launch time has been delayed suf-
Þciently into the future, the best response time of the development team jumps back,
favoring a much earlier launch. In Figure 12, we observe that at T = 16, the response
jumps forward discontinuously. Such jump occurs close to the point where the potential
pure strategy equilibrium could be realized, preventing such equilibrium from occurring
(the best response functions never cross). In absence of pure strategy equilibria, the conti-
nuity of our pay-oﬀ function directly implies the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium
(Gliksberg 1952, Dasgupta and Maskin 1986).
Second, as observed by Harsanyi (1973), mixed strategies do not have to be interpreted
as randomizations in the sense of tossing coins, but could capture (un-modeled) private
7Note that - of course - strictly speaking there exists no iterative adjustment in a simultaneous game.
The word iterative here is meant to illustrate the nature of the Nash equilibrium concept.
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information in the game (see also Vives 1999). The existence of private information is
plausible in the case of the launch time decisions, as players are unlikely to be fully
informed about the detailed decision situation of each other.
Third, mixed strategy equilibria are rather common in models of economics and market-
ing. For example, the reader might think of the launch time decision of a Þrm as a location
problem in a diﬀerentiated market. The optimal location of a store in a non-uniform mar-
ket depends upon the location of competing stores, and previous research has pointed to
the importance of mixed strategies in such games (Anderson et al. 1992). Similarly, Raju
et al. (1990) point to mixed strategies concerning the timing of price promotions.
We now turn to the case of asymmetric products, which is obviously more complicated
to analyze. Some general characterization of the entry Nash equilibrium however can still
be obtained. Note that if the solution to (20)-(21) exists, then T ∗1 is one of the local maxima
of Π1 (T1, T
∗
2 ) and T
∗
2 is one of the local maxima of Π2 (T
∗
1 , T2). Below we denote matching
pairs of local maxima of Π1 and Π2 as T
l
1 and T
l
2: T
l
1 is a local maximum of Π1
³
T1, T
l
2
´
and T l2 is a local maximum of Π1
³
T l1, T2
´
. The following result provides a characterization
of the properties of local maxima of the competitors proÞt functions:
Theorem 4b (non-symmetric products)
i) Let α1 + α2 6= 1, α1 + α2 < 2 and deÞne
θ1 =
pβ
³
1 + q
p
´α1+α2−1
(1− β)
1−α2
2−α1−α2 +
p
q(α1+α2−1)
³
β − 1−α2
2−α1−α2
´µ³
1 + q
p
´α1+α2−1 − 1¶ , (25)
θ2 =
pβ
³
1 + q
p
´α1+α2−1
(1− β)
1−α1
2−α1−α2 −
p
q(α1+α2−1)
³
β − 1−α2
2−α1−α2
´ µ³
1 + q
p
´α1+α2−1 − 1¶ . (26)
Then, T l1 = T
l
2 = 0 ⇔ ciγi1−ci ≤ θi, i = 1, 2.
ii) Let
bT1 =
Ã
−T |T ≤ 0, 1
M1
dM1
dT
=
c1γ1e
γ1T
1− c1eγ1T ,
d2M1
dT 2
1− c1eγ1T
1 + c1eγ1T
≤ γ1dM1
dT
!
, (27)
bT2 =
Ã
T |T ≥ 0, 1
m−M1
dM1
dT
=
c2γ2e
−γ2T
1− c2e−γ2T ,−
d2M1
dT 2
1− c2e−γ2T
1 + c2e−γ2T
≤ γ2dM1
dT
!
. (28)
Then, T l1 = 0, T
l
2 =
bT2 ⇔ c1γ11−c1 ≤ 1M1(bT2) dM1dT ³ bT2´. Also, T l1 = bT1, T l2 = 0 ⇔ c2γ21−c2 ≤
1
m−M1(bT1) dM1dT ³ bT1´.
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iii) Let
bT =

T |T = log
Ã 1c1 1M1 dM1dT
γ1+
1
M1
dM1
dT
! 1
γ1
Ã
1
c2
1
m−M1
dM1
dT
γ2+
1
m−M1
dM1
dT
!− 1
γ2
 ,
−dM1
dT
µ
γ2 +
2
dM1
dT
m−M1
¶
≤ d2M1
dT 2
≤ dM1
dT
µ
γ1 +
2
dM1
dT
M1
¶
 , (29)
Then,
T l1 = −
1
γ1
log

1
c1
1
M1(bT) dM1dT ³ bT´
γ1 +
1
M1(bT) dM1dT ³ bT´
 , (30)
T l2 = −
1
γ2
log

1
c2
1
m−M1(bT) dM1dT ³ bT´
γ2 +
1
m−M1(bT) dM1dT ³ bT´
 . (31)
While the statements of part i) of Theorem 4b relate to the most general case of
α1 + α2 6= 1, α1 + α2 < 2, similar statements for any other combination of diﬀusion
parameters can be easily obtained.
Several comments are due with respect to this Theorem. First, as indicated by Theorem
4a, the existence of the solutions to (27), (28) or (29) in the case of c1γ1
1−c1 > θ1 or
c2γ2
1−c2 > θ2
is not guaranteed. Second, the non-concavity of the lifecycle sales M1(T ) implies that the
uniqueness of the solutions to (27), (28) or (29), if they exist, is also not guaranteed. The
complex nature of the interaction between competitors in the diﬀusion model (4) requires
an evaluation of all possibilities outlined in parts i)-iii) of Theorem 4b for a given set of
problem parameters.
In order to illustrate the various cases of Theorem 4b, we conducted a numerical study
for the case of two symmetric products with diﬀerent cost structures (Table 2) as well as
two diﬀerent products with symmetric cost structures (Table 3).
The results in Table 2 suggest that a pure strategy equilibrium is more likely to exist if
the competitive diﬀusion occurs primarily at the brand level (α1 = α2 = 0.9) as opposed to
the category level. In this case, a completely symmetric set-up will lead to an immediate
launch of both competitors. This is consistent with the results of Theorem 4a. Note
that the potential cost improvement parameter c = 0.1 is less than the critical value
c∗ =
p
2 (1+
q
p)
2α−1
γ+ p
2(1+
q
p)
2α−1 = 0.48.
For higher values of the innovation parameter, there exists a competitive advantage
for one of the competitors. In this case, it becomes beneÞcial to trade this additional
advantage and capture some of the potential cost improvements by delaying launch. We
further note that as the diﬀusion shifts to the category level (α1 = α2 = 0.55), the pure
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strategy equilibrium becomes impossible to achieve. A similar situation occurs in the
case of non-symmetric competing products (α1 = 0.9,α2 = 0.55) unless the products are
balanced on the innovation scale. This observation is in agreement with the result of part
(i) of Theorem 4b: for the data parameters we consider, setting β to 0.5 allows the values
of θ1 and θ2 to exceed the respective cost parameter combinations, forcing the competitors
to focus exclusively on the market share side of their respective proÞt functions and,
therefore, to launch immediately.
Similar to Table 2, Table 3 illustrates the basic trade-oﬀ between potential cost improve-
ments and losses of sales. However, now we focus on the eﬀect of the cost parameters,
for a given set of diﬀusion characteristics, namely the one where consumers purchase at
the brand level (α1 = α2 = 0.9). Pure equilibria exist for a wide range of cost parameters.
When the potential cost savings are equally high for both products and can be achieved
equally fast (c1 = c2 = 0.5, γ1 = γ2 = 0.1), the pure strategy equilibrium will lead to
delayed launches for both players. In this case, both products are delayed by the same
amount of time (T ∗1 = T
∗
2 = 0.399). As cost savings for the second competitor become
harder to realize (c1 = c2 = 0.5, γ1 = 0.1, γ2 = 0.001), the equilibrium shifts to an imme-
diate launch of player 2. In contrast, player 1 prefers to slightly delay its launch, leading
to a better cost position (T ∗1 = 0.252, T
∗
2 = 0).
7 Practical Implications
Based on our results analyzing the impact of launch time on a new products demand
dynamics, we can now revisit the question of What is the Þnancial impact of a change in
launch time on the total proÞts over the products lifecycle?. Recall that such a dollar-
ization of changes in launch time allows a development team to trade-oﬀ the four product
development performance measures depicted in Figure 1. In this section we identify three
ways our results can be used to improve the decision making of a development team.
Shape of proÞt (launch time) function
Consider a project team developing a new product, which is planned to launch in August
2003. Holding everything else constant, the team will almost certainly prefer to have the
product ready to launch in June 2003. In other words, sales and - holding everything
else constant - proÞts, are increasing with acceleration. While this monotonic eﬀect of
acceleration on proÞts is rather straightforward, the second derivative of this eﬀect is much
harder to grasp. Common wisdom, as summarized for example in the graph by Urban
and Hauser (see Figure 2) suggests that there exist diminishing returns to acceleration. In
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the above example, this implies that the Þnancial gains of moving the launch time from
August 2003 to June 2003 would be larger than the additional gains of moving the launch
time from June 2003 to April 2003.
Our results analyzing the impact of launch time on a new products demand dynamics
allow us to analyze the second derivative of this eﬀect explicitly. Consider Figure 13, which
plots the impact of acceleration on revenue. Similar to the Urban and Hauser Figure, the
horizontal axis shows various levels of speed (40− T1). A fast launch corresponds to high
values on the horizontal axis. The vertical axis plots revenues for product 1, which we
Þnd - not surprisingly - to be increasing with speed. Consider the case where the diﬀusion
occurs primarily at the brand level (high values of αi). In this case, returns to acceleration
are - although steep - diminishing. Note further that this eﬀect is most pronounced at
the point of simultaneous market entry, consistent with the statements we reviewed from
Wheelwright and Clark above. In contrast, we observe that for products that diﬀuse
primarily at the category level (α1 = α2 = 0.5), this pattern changes fundamentally. The
reason for this is that returns to acceleration are high, if one product is ahead of the other
for a suﬃcient period of time to capture a signiÞcant part of the market potential m prior
to entry of the follower. If both Þrms are competing head-to-head, no Þrm will be able to
attract a signiÞcant portion of the market prior to the entry of the follower, which leads
to a point of no sales increase in the graph in Figure 13.
Second, consider again the situation of a development team working towards a planned
launch in August 2003. In January 2003, the development team learns that the other
Þrm pursuing development for a similar product experiences a set-back and will suﬀer a
three-months delay. How should the development team respond? Intuitively, one would
say that the competitors delay eases the time pressure on the team and that some of
this gain should be allocated to the other performance measures unit cost, development
budget, and design quality. This corresponds to a (slight) delay in launch. However, as
we showed in Figure 9, a delay in the competitors launch time might actually move the
optimal launch time forward, even if it comes at the expense of higher unit costs.
Quantitative Results
In addition to providing qualitative insights, our results can be used for an accurate
quantiÞcation of the change in proÞts as well as the change in sales trajectory that come
from a change in launch time. The closed form solutions provided by (15) and (16)
can easily be imported to a spread-sheet model which enables the development team to
evaluate and compare multiple launch time scenarios. This is directly compatible with
the four step procedure proposed by Ulrich and Eppinger. An example of this is given in
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Figure 14, which shows - for a given set of demand parameters - three sales trajectories
corresponding to three diﬀerent launch time scenarios. Observe that the Figure is similar
to the one proposed by Rosenthal, the horizontal axis captures time while the vertical axis
indicates per period revenues.
Now that we have a coherent model of demand dynamics, we can also analyze other
scenarios not considered by Rosenthal, including the case when the competitors product
has already been launched and the case where products diﬀer in terms of their desirability.
For example, Figure 14a shows that product 1 can continue its increase in sales beyond
the entry of product 2, as product 1 beneÞts from its strong word-of-mouth at the brand
level (α1 = 0.9).
We also observe that as long as the word-of-mouth happens primarily at the brand
level, the market leader is only moderately impacted by the beginning of the competitive
period. Figure 14b shows an example in which the pioneering product is of lower quality.
The moment the second product enters, its sales start to drop, which is consistent with
Rosenthals prediction.
Structural Result: Applicability of trade-oﬀ rules
While the previous two improvements enable development teams to more accurately
understand the Þnancial consequences of a changed launch time, leading to reÞned trade-
oﬀ rules, the third improvement questions the usage of trade-oﬀ rules per-se. Again,
consider a development team working towards a planned launch in August 2003. The
team debates if the launch should be delayed to October 2003. The extra two months
would reduce product unit costs, which - over the product lifecycle - accumulates to a
saving of $500k. At the same time, the delay would reduce lifecycle sales by $1 million.
Note that these numbers already assume that the development correctly calculates the
impact an October 2003 launch would have on the sales trajectory. Should the launch be
delayed?
Under the assumption of diminishing returns to acceleration (e.g. Urban and Hauser),
the answer is a profound No. As long as the second derivatives as depicted in Figure 13
are well-behaved, a marginal analysis of proÞts leads the development team to the proÞt
optimal launch time. However, given the more complicated curvature established in this
paper, a development team might end-up in a local proÞt maximum, not realizing that
higher proÞts are obtainable if the launch is altered more substantially. An example of
this is provided by Figure 15, which shows a locally optimal solution at T1 = 12 and a
second point with zero derivative at T1 = 24.
The Þrst local optimum captures the point in which product 1 enters the market Þrst.
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Delaying market entry further shortens the period product 1 is alone on the market,
accelerating (launching before 12) would increase unit costs even further. The second
local optimum corresponds to the case where product 1 is a low-cost follower. The local
optimality of this point reßects that a further delay of entry would leave product 1 with
a suﬃciently long monopoly period to capture most of the market. On the other hand,
launching earlier would increase unit costs. We observe based on Figure 15 that the
proÞtability of the second optimum decreases with the attractiveness of the competing
product.
The existence of several competing local optima is especially important given the cross-
functional nature of product development. Product development decisions typically need
to balance the views of various organizational groups involved in the project. In our
example above, the marketing representatives on the development team might advocate
an accelerated launch of April 2003. In contrast, the engineering representative might
request a delay to October 2003. A project manager attempting to Þnd a reasonable
compromise between these diﬀerent proposals is likely to choose some launch time in
between, which - in light of Figure 15 (the one with the two proÞt maxima) - might not
be a good choice.
8 Discussion and Conclusion
We have started this manuscript with the question what is the cost of a one day launch
delay? The literature contains a rather diverse set of qualitative approaches to this
problem. While all approaches seem intuitively correct, a scientiÞc debate on which one
of them is appropriate for a given managerial situation is impossible without an explicit
list of underlying assumptions. Especially, the question of how a delayed launch aﬀects
the demand dynamics of the new product is hard to answer without specifying a formal
model of market demand.
We have presented a detailed demand model of brand-level competition within a Bass-
type category diﬀusion. Our model includes a market saturation eﬀect and word-of-mouth
eﬀects at both the category and the brand level. We also explicitly capture the cross word-
of-mouth eﬀects between diﬀerent brands, which allows us model diﬀerences in product
attractiveness. This is the most general demand model that has been used for a normative
analysis of entry timing in competitive new product diﬀusion and it matches the current
state-of-the-art of empirical research (see Table 1).
In this general setting, we provide analytical results for both productss sales trajectories
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as well as their lifecycle sales (Theorem 1). We use these results to study the impact of
launch time delay (acceleration) on overall lifecycle sales (Theorem 2). While at the
aggregate level, these results show a remarkable similarity to the qualitative arguments
of the existing literature (Figure 2), we show that our analytical Þndings have direct
practical implications for product development decision making, especially with respect to
the coordination between marketing and operations (Theorem 3). We also use our results
to study the resulting game between two brands choosing their launch times strategically
(Theorem 4).
Our analysis related to the cost of delayed product launch opens up several opportunities
for future research. First, our model of competition in launch times could be extended
to include price competition between the two brands. This would combine our work
with earlier research by Eliashberg and Jeuland (1986) as well as Krishnan et al. (1999).
Second, the focus of our analysis was on the trade-oﬀ between unit production costs and
sales revenues. As discussed above, a similar trade-oﬀ exists between product performance,
and thus ultimately product attractiveness, and sales revenues. For example Kouvelis and
Mukhopadhyay (1999) include a control variable about the design quality of the product.
Third, our model opens the door for empirical research, which could estimate our measures
of product attractiveness. In current models, this eﬀect is frequently compounded with
the timing of market introduction, which makes it hard to determine if a newly introduced
brand failed because the incumbent brand had already gained suﬃcient market share or
because of superior design quality.
In summary, we believe that more research is needed to quantify trade-oﬀs between
product development performance metrics, moving from intuitive arguments and ad-hoc
decision rules to more formal and transparent scientiÞc reasoning8.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
In our proof we only consider the case of T < 0, since the proof for T > 0 follows
similar steps. For T < 0 product 2 follows Bass-like diﬀusion for a period of time equal to
T before the Þrst sales of product 1 occur at t = tc. By that time, the cumulative sales
of product 2 reach the level of D2(T ). Thus, for t > tc the competitive diﬀusion process
proceeds according to (1) subject to initial conditions D1(t = tc) = 0, D2(t = tc) = D2(T ).
Consider an adjusted sales function D2(t) = D2(t)−D2(T ), where t = t − tc: for t ≥ 0
(1) becomes
dD1
dt
=
Ã
p1(T ) +
1
m(T )
³
q11(T )D1(t) + q12(T )D2(t)
´!³
m(T )−D1(t)−D2(t)
´
,
dD2
dt
=
Ã
p2(T ) +
1
m(T )
³
q21(T )D1(t) + q22(T )D2(t)
´!³
m(T )−D1(t)−D2(t)
´
,(32)
with initial conditions D1(t = 0) = D2(t = 0) = 0, where m(T ), pi(T ), and qij(T ) are
given by (11), (12), and (13), respectively.
Proof of Theorem 1
In the case when competing products enter the market simultaneously (T = 0), we use
the system of diﬀusion equations (4) for t ≥ tc to get
dD1
dt
=
µ
pβ +
q
m
((α1 + α2 − 1)D1(t) + (1− α2)D(t))
¶
(m−D) . (33)
Then, using Bass equation for the category sales D(t), we obtain
dD1
dD
=
pβ + q
m
((α1 + α2 − 1)D1 + (1− α2)D)
p+ q
m
D
. (34)
Below we focus on the only non-trivial case 0 < α1 + α2 < 2, α1 + α2 6= 1. We deÞne
D1 = D1 +
pm(β+α2−1)
q(α1+α2−1) , D = D +
pm
q
, to obtain
dD1
dD
= (α1 + α2 − 1)D1
D
+ 1− α2. (35)
Introducing u
³
D
´
= D1
D
, we can re-express (35) as
u0D = (α1 + α2 − 2)u+ 1− α2 (36)
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which can be integrated with the initial conditions D1(tc) = D2(tc) = 0 to yield
D1 =
pm
q (α1 + α2 − 1)
Ã
β − (1− α2)
(2− α1 − α2)
!Ã1 + q
pm
D
!α1+α2−1
− 1
+ (1− α2)
(2− α1 − α2)D
(37)
In the case of the delay in the market entry between the two products, we apply the
transformation of Lemma 1 to (37) to obtain (15). The expressions for the lifecycle sales
for both products (16) are immediately obtained by substituting m for D(t) in (15).
Proof of Theorem 2
In our analysis of (16) we focus on the case of T > 0, α1 + α2 < 2,α1 + α2 6= 1, since
the proofs for the remaining cases are easily obtained by following similar steps.
For T > 0, (16) becomes (here we omit the implied dependence on T )
M1 =
Ã
(1− α1)D
2− α1 − α2 +
pm
q (α1 + α2 − 1)
Ã
β − (1− α2)
(2− α1 − α2)
!! 1 + qp
1 + qD
pm
α1+α2−1
+
(1− α2)
(2− α1 − α2)m−
pm
q (α1 + α2 − 1)
Ã
β − (1− α2)
(2− α1 − α2)
!
, (38)
Diﬀerentiating (38) with respect to D yields
∂M1
∂D
=
³
1 + q
p
´α1+α2−1
³
1 + qD
pm
´α1+α2
Ã
1− β + q (1− α1)D
pm
!
> 0. (39)
As a result, dM1
dT
= ∂M1
∂D
∂D
∂T
> 0. Further, diﬀerentiating (38) with respect to β, we get
∂M1
∂β
=
pm
q (α1 + α2 − 1)

 1 + qp
1 + qD
pm
α1+α2−1 − 1
+ ∂M1
∂D
∂D
∂β
> 0, (40)
since both addends on the right-hand side of (40) are positive.
The easiest way to show the monotonicity of M1 with respect to α1 is by using the
original diﬀusion equations. Consider changing α1 to α1 + δα and deÞne
f1(t) = lim
δα→0
Ã
D1(t,α+ δα)−D1(t,α)
δα
!
. (41)
Subtracting product 1 diﬀusion equation for α1 + δα from that one for α1, dividing the
diﬀerence by δα, and taking the limit of δα→ 0, we get a diﬀerential equation for f1(t) :
df1(t)
dt
=
q
m
(m−D) (α1 + α2 − 1) f1(t) + q
m
(m−D)D1, (42)
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with the initial condition f1(t = 0) = 0. Let us deÞne t0 = min (t > 0, f(t) > 0). From the
initial condition on f1(t) and the non-negativity of
q
m
(m−D)D1 it follows that f1(t) = 0
for all t ∈ [0, t0). Then, df1(t=t0−0)dt > 0, and f1(t) remains positive for some Þnite interval
after t0. After that, f1(t) cannot return to 0 due to the presence of the term
q
m
(m−D)D1
in (42). Thus, f1(t) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ t0, and, consequently, D1(t,α+δα)−D1(t,α)δα > 0 for small
enough δα. As a result, ∂M1
∂α1
> 0. Similarly, ∂M2
∂α2
> 0, so that ∂M1
∂α2
= ∂(m−M2)
∂α1
< 0.
For the second-order properties of M1 we get
d2M1
dT 2
=
Ã
dD
dT
!2
dM1
dD
 d
dD
Ã
log
Ã
dM1
dD
!!
+
1
dD
dT
d
dT
Ã
log
Ã
dD
dT
!! , (43)
so that the sign of d
2M1
dT 2
is the same as the sign of
f
³
D
´
= m
 d
dD
Ã
log
Ã
dM1
dD
!!
+
1
dD
dT
d
dT
Ã
log
Ã
dD
dT
!!
=
1
p(1−β)
q(1−α1) + Y
− α1 + α2p
q
+ Y
+
1
pβ
qα1
+ Y
− 1
1− Y , (44)
where Y = D
m
. In (44) we have used (39) and the fact that dD
dT
=
³
pβ + qα1
m
D
´ ³
m−D
´
for T > 0. Further, deÞne
A0 =
Ã
p
q
!2 1− β
1− α1 +
β
α1
−
³
α1 + α2 +
p
q
´
β (1− β)
α1 (1− α1)
 ,
A1 =
p
q
Ã
(1− α1 − α2)
Ã
1− β
1− α1 +
β
α1
!
+ 2
!
+
Ã
p
q
!2 Ã
2 (α1 + α2)β (1− β)
α1 (1− α1) + (α1 + α2 − 1)
Ã
1− β
1− α1 +
β
α1
!!
,
A2 = 2− α1 − α2 + p
q
Ã
(α1 + α2 − 1)
Ã
1− β
1− α1 +
β
α1
!
− 2
!
, A3 = α1 + α2 − 3,(45)
and let
Y min = min(Y |A3Y 3 +A2Y 2 +A1Y +A0 = 0, 0 ≤ Y ≤ 1),
Y max = max(Y |A3Y 3 +A2Y 2 +A1Y +A0 = 0, 0 ≤ Y ≤ 1). (46)
Re-arranging terms in (44), we obtain
f
³
D
´
=
A3
³
Y
´3
+A2
³
Y
´2
+A1Y +A0³
p(1−β)
q(1−α1) + Y
´ ³
p
q
+ Y
´ ³
pβ
qα1
+ Y
´ ³
1− Y
´ (47)
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with Ai, i = 0, .., 3, deÞned in (45). We note that
P3
i=0Ai < 0, and, thus, f
³
D
´
< 0 for
Y > Y max. Finally, the sign of f for Y < Y min is determined by the sign of A0. The
connection between T and Y is established from (6), so that
Tmin =
1
pβ + qα1
log
1− qα1Y minpβ
1− Y min
 , Tmax = 1pβ + qα1 log
1− qα1Ymaxpβ
1− Y max
 . (48)
Proof of Theorem 3
The the optimal solution to (10) is given by of the critical points of the proÞt function
M1(T )
³
1− ce−γ(T2−T )
´
or by T2. Diﬀerentiating the proÞt function with respect to T , we
obtain an equation for the set S of proÞts critical points
γ
µ
1− 1
1− ceγ(T−T2)
¶
+
d log (M1(T ))
dT
= 0, (49)
where M1 is expressed by (16). Let Sc be a subset of S such that for every Tc ∈ Sc
−cγ2eγ(Tc−T2)
(1− ceγ(Tc−T2))2 +
d2 log (M1(Tc))
d (Tc)
2 < 0. (50)
Sc represents a set of local maxima of the proÞt function. Then, the optimal launch gap
for product 1, T ∗ is
T ∗ = arg max
T∈{Sc∪T2}
³³
1− ceγ(T−T2)
´
M1(T )
´
. (51)
Clearly, in order to proof the statement in a), it is suﬃcient to consider the sensitivity
properties of the critical points Tc. Diﬀerentiating (49) with respect to c, we get
∂Tc
∂c
=
γeγ(Tc−T2)
(1−ceγ(Tc−T2))2Ã
−cγ2eγ(Tc−T2)
(1−ceγ(Tc−T2))2
+ d
2 log(M1(Tc))
d(Tc)
2
! < 0, (52)
as the numerator in (49) is positive and the denominator is negative, according to (50).
Similarly,
∂Tc
∂T2
= −
cγ2eγ(Tc−T2)
(1−ceγ(Tc−T2))2Ã
−cγ2eγ(Tc−T2)
(1−ceγ(Tc−T2))2
+ d
2 log(M1(Tc))
d(Tc)
2
! > 0, (53)
For the derivative with respect to α2 we obtain
∂Tc
∂α2
= −
∂
∂α2
³
d log(M1(Tc))
dTc
´
Ã
−cγ2eγ(Tc−T2)
(1−ceγ(Tc−T2))2
+ d
2 log(M1(Tc))
d(Tc)
2
! . (54)
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so that the sign of ∂Tc
∂α2
coincides with the sign of ∂
∂α2
³
d log(M1(Tc))
dTc
´
. Below we analyze the
case T > 0 (the proof for the case T < 0 follows similar steps). We note that
dM1 (Tc)
dTc
=
³
1 + q
p
´α1+α2−1
³
1 + qD
pm
´α1+α2
Ã
1− β + q (1− α1)D
pm
!
dD(Tc)
dTc
, (55)
and, that for T > 0, ∂D(Tc)
∂α2
= 0. The sign of ∂
∂α2
³
dM1(Tc)
dTc
´
coincides with the sign of
∂
∂α2
³
log
³
dM1(Tc)
dTc
´´
, and
∂
∂α2
Ã
log
Ã
dM1 (Tc)
dTc
!!
= log
 1 + qp
1 + qD
pm
 > 0. (56)
Theorem 2 states that ∂M1
∂α2
< 0, so that
∂
∂α2
Ã
d log (M1 (Tc))
dTc
!
= − 1
(M1 (Tc))
2
∂M1
∂α2
dM1 (Tc)
dTc
+
1
M1 (Tc)
∂
∂α2
Ã
dM1 (Tc)
dTc
!
> 0,
(57)
and ∂Tc
∂α2
> 0. Further,
∂Tc
∂γ
= −
³
ceγ(Tc−T2)
1−ceγ(Tc−T2)
´ ³
−1 + γ(T2−Tc)
1−ce−γ(T2−Tc)
´
Ã
−cγeγ(Tc−T2)
(1−ceγ(Tc−T2))2
+ d
2 log(M1(Tc))
d(Tc)
2
! . (58)
so that ∂Tc
∂γ
> 0 when γ(T2−Tc)
1−ce−γ(T2−Tc) > 1 and
∂Tc
∂γ
< 0 when γ(T2−Tc)
1−ce−γ(T2−Tc) < 1. Letting x =
γ (T2 − Tc) and deÞning x (c) as the solution to (1− x)ex = c, we observe that ∂Tc∂γ < 0 is
equivalent to x < x(c). Further, for γ = 0, Tc equals to T2, since in that case (10) reduces
to maximization ofM1(T ). Then, for small γ,
∂Tc
∂γ
< 0 and ∂(γ(T2−Tc))
∂γ
> 0. As γ grows, the
inequality ∂Tc
∂γ
< 0 remains valid for γ ≤ γ∗ = min(γ|γ(T2 − T ∗) = x(c)). At γ∗, ∂Tc∂γ = 0,
and ∂(γ(T2−Tc))
∂γ
= (T2 − Tc) > 0, so that ∂Tc∂γ ≥ 0 for γ slightly above γ∗. It is clear that if,
at any greater value of γ, γ (T2 − Tc) again becomes equal to x(c), then, for that value of
γ, ∂Tc
∂γ
= 0, and ∂(γ(T2−Tc))
∂γ
> 0, so that γ (T2 − Tc) will again become greater than x(c),
and ∂Tc
∂γ
will remain non-negative.
In order to prove part b), we focus on the Þrst-order necessary equation for the local
maxima of the proÞt function (49). We can re-write this equation as
exp (−γ (T2 − T )) = 1
c
Ã
h(T )
γ + h(T )
!
, (59)
where
h(T ) =
d log (M1(T ))
dT
. (60)
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On the one hand, for T > 0 we use (55) to obtain
h(T ) =
1
M1
³
1 + q
p
´α1+α2−1
³
1 + qD
pm
´α1+α2
Ã
1− β + q (1− α1)D
pm
!
dD(T )
dT
≥ p(1− β)
m (p+ q)
dD(T )
dT
≥ p
2β(1− β)
(p+ q)
min
Ã
1,
(pβ + qα1)
2 e(pβ+qα1)T2
(qα1 + pβe(pβ+qα1)T2)
2
!
= h∗(T2 > 0)(61)
where we have utilized the deÞnition ofD(T > 0) = D1(T ) (6). We note that
(pβ+qα1)
2e(pβ+qα1)T2
(qα1+pβe(pβ+qα1)T2)
2 <
1 if and only if T2 >
2
pβ+qα1
log
³
qα1
pβ
´
.
For T < 0 (product 2 is introduced before product 1), we can introduce T = −T =
T1 − T2 > 0, so that
h(T ) =
1
M1
dM1
dT
=
dM2
dD(T )
dD(T )
dT
1
m−M2
=
dM2
dD(T )
Ã
p(1− β) + qα2D(T )
m
! ³
m−D(T )
´
(m−M2) (62)
where we have used the Bass identity dD(T )
dT
=
µ
p(1− β) + qα2D(T )m
¶³
m−D(T )
´
. Now,
since for T > 0, m ≥M2 ≥ D(T ), we have (m−D(T ))(m−M2) ≥ 1, and
h(T ) ≥ dM2
dD(T )
Ã
p(1− β) + qα2D(T )
m
!
≥ p
2β(1− β)
(p+ q)
(63)
where we have used (55) and the fact that 0 ≤ D(T ) ≤ m. If T2 < 0, and the product 2 is
already on the market, the launch gap T can only be negative and (59) has no solutions,
provided that 1
c
³
h∗(T2<0)
γ+h∗(T2<0)
´
> 1, which is equivalent to h∗(T2 < 0) =
p2β(1−β)
(p+q)
> cγ
1−c . If,
on the other hand, T2 ≥ 0, then T can be both positive as well as negative. Negative
solutions to (59) do not exist if p
2β(1−β)
(p+q)
> cγ
1−c , and the positive solutions are eliminated
when h∗(T2 > 0) > cγ1−c .
Proof of Theorem 4a
Considering the case with T ∗1 = T
∗
2 we note that there are two possibilities: T
∗
1 = T
∗
2 = 0
and T ∗1 = T
∗
2 > 0. The Þrst case is possible if
∂Π1(T1,0)
∂T1
|T1=0 ≤ 0 and ∂Π2(0,T2)∂T2 |T2=0 ≤ 0.
Using problem symmetry, we get
∂Π1 (T1, 0)
∂T1
|T1=0 =
∂Π2 (0, T2)
∂T2
|T2=0 = cγ
m
2
− (1− c) m
2
p
³
1 + q
p
´2α−1
2
 , (64)
so that
∂Π1 (T1, 0)
∂T1
|T1=0 =
∂Π2 (0, T2)
∂T2
|T2=0 ≤ 0⇔ c ≤ c∗. (65)
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The necessary condition for the existence of T ∗1 = T
∗
2 = T > 0 can be formulated as
∂Π2(T,T2)
∂T2
|T2=T = 0, or
∂Π2 (T, T2)
∂T2
|T2=T = cγe−γT
m
2
−
³
1− ce−γT
´ m
2
p
³
1 + q
p
´2α−1
2
 = 0, (66)
which, in turn, implies the unique solution
T =
1
γ
log
µ
c
c∗
¶
. (67)
The last expression is positive if and only if c > c∗. It is easy to check that the suﬃcient
condition for (67) to be the local maximum of Π2 (T, T2),
∂2Π2(T,T2)
(∂T2)2
|T2=T ≤ 0, is satisÞed.
Thus, if entry-time Nash equilibrium exists, it is reached at (67). However, (67) may not
be the global maximum of Π2 (T, T2) with respect to T2 - for example, when Π2 (T, 0) is
greater than Π2 (T, T ). Thus, if Π2 (T, 0) > Π2 (T, T ), no solution to (20) and (21) exists.
We note that
Π2 (T, T ) = (m−M1(0)) (1− ce−γT ) = m
2
(1− c∗) , (68)
while
Π2 (T, 0) = (m−M1(−T )) (1− c) =
m
2
+
D∗
2
 1 + qp
1 + qD
∗
pm
2α−1
 (1− c) , (69)
where
D∗ = m
1− qα+ p2
qα+ p
2
e(qα+
p
2 )T
 = m
1− qα+
p
2
qα+ p
2
³
c
c∗
´ qα+ p2
γ
 . (70)
Thus, Π2 (T, 0) > Π2 (T, T ) is equivalent to
(1− c∗)
(1− c) < 1 +B (c)
 1 + qp
1 + q
p
B (c)
2α−1 . (71)
where
B (c) = 1− qα+
p
2
qα+ p
2
³
c
c∗
´ qα+p2
γ
. (72)
Proof of Theorem 4b
i) We observe that T l1 = T
l
2 = 0 ⇔
³
∂Π1(T1,0)
∂T1
|T1=0 ≤ 0, ∂Π2(0,T2)∂T2 |T2=0 ≤ 0
´
. Note that,
according to (18)
∂Π1 (T1, 0)
∂T1
|T1=0 =
Ã
dM1 (−T1)
dT1
³
1− c1e−γ1T1
´
+M1 (−T1) c1γ1e−γ1T1
!
|T1=0
38
= −dM1 (T )
dT
|T=0 (1− c1) +M1 (0) c1γ1
= −p(1− β)mβ
Ã
1 +
q
p
!α1+α2−1
(1− c1)
+c1γ1m
×
 1− α2
2− α1 − α2 +
p
³
β − 1−α2
2−α1−α2
´
q (α1 + α2 − 1)
Ã1 + q
p
!α1+α2−1
− 1

= m (1− c1)
µ
c1γ1
1− c1 − θ1
¶
×
 1− α2
2− α1 − α2 +
p
³
β − 1−α2
2−α1−α2
´
q (α1 + α2 − 1)
Ã1 + q
p
!α1+α2−1
− 1
 ,(73)
and, similarly,
∂Π2 (0, T2)
∂T2
|T2=0 = −p(1− β)mβ
Ã
1 +
q
p
!α1+α2−1
(1− c2)
+c2γ2m
×
 1− α1
2− α1 − α2 −
p
³
β − 1−α2
2−α1−α2
´
q (α1 + α2 − 1)
Ã1 + q
p
!α1+α2−1
− 1

= m(1− c2)
µ
c2γ2
1− c2 − θ2
¶
×
 1− α1
2− α1 − α2 −
p
³
β − 1−α2
2−α1−α2
´
q (α1 + α2 − 1)
Ã1 + q
p
!α1+α2−1
− 1
 .(74)
It is easy to show that
1− α2
2− α1 − α2 +
p
q (α1 + α2 − 1)
µ
β − 1− α2
2− α1 − α2
¶Ã1 + q
p
!α1+α2−1
− 1
 ≥ 0,
1− α1
2− α1 − α2 −
p
q (α1 + α2 − 1)
µ
β − 1− α2
2− α1 − α2
¶Ã1 + q
p
!α1+α2−1
− 1
 ≥ 0,(75)
provided that p < q, which is the standard assumption in Bass dynamics.
Thus,
³
∂Π1(T1,0)
∂T1
|T1=0 ≤ 0, ∂Π2(0,T2)∂T2 |T2=0 ≤ 0
´
⇔
³
c1γ1
1−c1 ≤ θ1, c2γ21−c2 ≤ θ2
´
.
ii) Below we prove the statement for the case of T l1 = 0, T
l
2 > 0 since the statement
for T l1 > 0, T
l
2 = 0 is obtained by simple interchange of indices and replacement of M1 by
m−M1 and β by 1− β. Note that
³
T l1 = 0, T
l
2 > 0
´
⇔µ
∂Π1(T1,T l2)
∂T1
|T1=0 ≤ 0, ∂Π2(0,T2)∂T2 |T2=T l2 = 0,
∂2Π2(0,T2)
(∂T2)2
|T2=T l2 ≤ 0
¶
. Since, according to (19),
∂Π2 (0, T )
∂T
= −dM1 (T )
dT
³
1− c2e−γ2T
´
+ (m−M (T )) c2γ2e−γ2T , (76)
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and
∂2Π2 (0, T )
(∂T )2
= −d
2M1 (T )
dT 2
³
1− c2e−γ2T
´
−2dM1 (T )
dT
c2γ2e
−γ2T−(m−M (T )) c2(γ2)2e−γ2T .
(77)
DeÞning by bT2 all T for which the right-hand side of (76) is 0 and the right-hand side
of (77) is non-positive, we get (28). Finally, according to (18),
∂Π1
³
T1, T
l
2
´
∂T1
|T1=0 = −
dM1
³
T l2
´
dT
(1− c1) +M1
³
T l2
´
c1γ1, (78)
so that
∂Π1
³
T1, T
l
2
´
∂T1
|T1=0 ≤ 0⇔
c1γ1
1− c1 ≤
1
M1
³
T l2
´ dM1
³
T l2
´
dT
. (79)
iii) Similarly to the proofs in parts a) and b), we observe that
³
T l1 > 0, T
l
2 > 0
´
⇔µ
∂Π2(T l1,T2)
∂T2
|T2=T l2 = 0,
∂2Π2(T l1,T2)
(∂T2)2
|T2=T l2 ≤ 0,
∂Π1(T1,T l2)
∂T1
|T1=T l1 = 0,
∂2Π1(T1,T l2)
(∂T1)2
|T1=T l1 ≤ 0
¶
. Now,
∂Π2
³
T l1, T2
´
∂T2
|T2=T l2 = −
dM1
³
T l2 − T l1
´
dT
³
1− c2e−γ2T l2
´
+
³
m−M1
³
T l2 − T l1
´´
c2γ2e
−γ2T l2 ,
∂Π1
³
T1, T
l
2
´
∂T1
|T1=T l1 = −
dM1
³
T l2 − T l1
´
dT
³
1− c1e−γ1T l1
´
+M1
³
T l2 − T l1
´
c1γ1e
−γ1T l1 . (80)
Equating the right-hand sides of (80) to 0, and denoting T l = T l2 − T l1, we get
T l1 = −
1
γ1
log

1
c1
1
M1(T l)
dM1
dT
³
T l
´
γ1 +
1
M1(T l)
dM1
dT
(T l)
 , (81)
T l2 = −
1
γ2
log

1
c2
1
m−M1(T l)
dM1
dT
³
T l
´
γ2 +
1
m−M1(T l)
dM1
dT
(T l)
 , (82)
so that
T l = log


1
c1
1
M1(T l)
dM1
dT
³
T l
´
γ1 +
1
M1(T l)
dM1
dT
(T l)

1
γ1

1
c2
1
m−M1(T l)
dM1
dT
³
T l
´
γ2 +
1
m−M1(T l)
dM1
dT
(T l)

− 1
γ2
 . (83)
Further,
∂2Π2
³
T l1, T2
´
(∂T2)2
|T2=T l2 = −
d2M1
³
T l2 − T l1
´
dT 2
³
1− c2e−γ2T l2
´
− 2dM1
³
T l2 − T l1
´
dT
c2γ2e
−γ2T l2
40
−
³
m−M1
³
T l2 − T l1
´´
c2(γ2)
2e−γ2T
l
2 , (84)
∂2Π1
³
T1, T
l
2
´
(∂T1)2
|T1=T l1 =
d2M1
³
T l2 − T l1
´
dT 2
³
1− c1e−γ1T l1
´
− 2
dM1
³
T l2 − T l1
´
dT
c1γ1e
−γ1T l1
−M1
³
T l2 − T l1
´
c1(γ1)
2e−γ1T
l
1 . (85)
Combining (84) and (85) with (80), we get
∂2Π2
³
T l1, T2
´
(∂T2)2
|T2=T l2 ≤ 0⇔ −
d2M1
³
T l2 − T l1
´
dT 2
≤ γ2
dM1
³
T l2 − T l1
´
dT
1 + c2e
−γ2T l2
1− c2e−γ2T l2
, (86)
∂2Π1
³
T1, T
l
2
´
(∂T1)2
|T1=T l1 ≤ 0⇔
d2M1
³
T l2 − T l1
´
dT 2
≤ γ1
dM1
³
T l2 − T l1
´
dT
1 + c1e
−γ1T l1
1− c1e−γ1T l1
. (87)
Now, using (81) and (82), we obtain
γ2
1 + c2e
−γ2T l2
1− c2e−γ2T l2
= γ2 +
2
m−M1 (T l)
dM1
dT
³
T l
´
, (88)
γ1
1 + c1e
−γ1T l1
1− c1e−γ1T l1
= γ1 +
2
M1 (T l)
dM1
dT
³
T l
´
. (89)
Thus, the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for T l1 and T
l
2 to be matching maxima of
the proÞt functions are expressed by (29) and (30) with (31).
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Kalish, Mahajan, and 
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at the brand level 
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b) entry timing for second 
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different attractiveness levels  
a) 2 (after entry)  
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Table 1: Empirical and Analytical Models of Competitive New Product Diffusion
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Cost
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Product
Cost
Product 
performance
Development 
Time
New Product
Profitability
Figure 1: Trade-offs in product development (left) and the need for ‘dollarizati
Source: Smith and Reinertsen (1991)
Ulrich and Eppinger (1999)
Figure 2: Qualitative arguments on the impact of an additional development time.
Time to 
product launch
Opportunity 
Cost of lost 
profit
Source: Kalyanaram and Krishnan (1997)
X: start of competitive 
phase (of decreasing 
demand in monopoly)
Earlier time of 
product launch
Cost and
Revenue
Source: Urban and Hauser (1993)
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Launch
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Source: Rosenthal (1992)
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Figure 3: The model of brand level adoption in a presence of competition.
Pool of potential adopters: m-D1(t)-D2(t)
Customers who adopt based 
on advertising (innovators)
D1(t): Adopters of Brand 1
p1q11 q21
D2(t): Adopters of Brand 2
p2q22 q12
Customers who adopt 
based on word of mouth 
from a previous adopter of 
the same category AND the 
same brand
Customers who adopt based 
on word of mouth from a 
previous adopter of the same 
category but of a 
DIFFERENT brand
Figure 5: Demand rate for competitor 1 as a function of the launch gap T (p = 0.0163221, q = 
0.325044, m = 4.12984x107, a1 = a2 = 0.9, b = 0.5).
t
dt
dD1
5 10 15 20 25 30
500000
1´10
6
1.5´10
6
2´10
6
2.5´106
3´106
T=-20
T=-10
T=0
T=10
T=20
Figure 4: Demand rate for competitor 1 as a function of the launch gap T (p = 0.0163221, q = 
0.325044, m = 4.12984x107, a1 = a2 = 0.5, b = 0.5).
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Figure 7: Rate of market share loss for different values of the category-level 
imitation parameter q (c = 0.2, a1 = 0.5, a2 = 0.5, b = 0.5, T2 = 50)
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Figure 6: Rate of market share loss as a function of launch gap T
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Figure 8: Rate of market share loss in the case of brands with 
different attractiveness levels (c = 0.2, b = 0.5, T2 = 50, a1= 0.8, a2=0.6).
T
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Figure 9: Optimal launch time for product 1, T1
* , as a function of 
anticipated entry of product 2 (c  = 0.6, g = 0.2, a1 = a2 = 0.3, b = 0.9).
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Figure 10ab: Sensitivity Analysis: optimal launch gap T* as a function of cost parameter c (g 
= 0.1, a1 = a2 = 0.9, b = 0.5, T2 =30) (7a) and attractiveness of competing product a2 (g = 0.1, a1 = 
0.09, c=0.99, b = 0.9, T2 =30) (7b). 
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Figure 11: Optimal gap T* as a function of DFM-effectiveness parameter g
(c  = 0.6, a1 = 0.9, a2 = 0.9, b = 0.5, T2 = 30).
Figure 12: The best time response functions in the case of symmetric products (p = 0.0163221, q = 
0.325044, m = 4.12984x107, c  = 0.5, g = 0.1, a1 = a2 = 0.55, b = 0.5).
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Figure 13: Revenues as a function of launch acceleration.
 
 b = 0.01 b = 0.5 b = 0.99 
a1 = a2 = 0.9 T1
*=0; T2
*=4.06 T1
*=0; T2
*=0 T1
*=4.06; T2
*=0 
a1 = a2 = 0.55 No pure equilibrium No pure equilibrium No pure equilibrium 
a1 =0.9; a2 = 0.55 No pure equilibrium T1
*=0; T2
*=0 No pure equilibrium 
 
Table 2: Existence of Nash-equilibrium entry times for two competitors with symmetric 
cost structures: c1=c2=0.1, g1= g2=0.1 (p=0.0163221, q=0.325044, m=4.12984x107). 
 
 g1 = 0.1; g2 = 0.1 g1 = 0.1; g2 = 0.001 g1 = 0.001; g2 = 0.1 
c1 = c 2 = 0.5 T1
*= T2
*=0.399 T1
*=0.252; T2
*=0 T1
*=0; T2
*=0.252 
c1 = c 2 = 0.001 T1
*=0; T2
*=0 T1
*=0; T2
*=0 T1
*=0; T2
*=0 
c1 = 0.5; c 2 = 0.001 T1
*=0.252; T2
*=0 T1
*=0.252; T2
*=0 T1
*=0; T2
*=0 
 
Table 3: Nash-equilibrium entry times for two products with symmetric diffusion 
parameters: a1=a2=0.9, b=0.5 (p=0.0163221, q=0.325044, m=4.12984x107). 
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Figure 14ab: Revenue rate for different launch scenarios (a1= 0.9, a2=0.9 left and
a1= 0.3, a2=0.8 right).
Figure 15: Local maxima in the profit function
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